Critical analysis: Gillett on gender

 No, not Gillette (that's a whole other article), but George Gillett, who wrote this. Having seen the article cited in Twitter, and mistakenly believing it to be recent (big fail - the date is right there), I asked some of my students to write a critical analysis, and being the responsible teacher I am, decided I ought to come up with one of my own for illustrative purposes. This was done late last night and could do with a great deal of polishing, not to mention citations. Provided without warranty, in case anyone finds it useful or at least cautionary. Copy-paste from Word.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE ‘We shouldn’t fight for “gender equality”. We should fight to abolish gender’ (George Gillett, New Statesman, 2014)

"[T]he end goal of feminist revolution must be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of male privilege but of the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings would no longer matter culturally." (Firestone, 1970). Leaving aside the absence of the term “gender” (coined, in its present meaning, during the 1950s, but not yet in widespread use when Firestone was writing), this statement appears to mirror the vision summed up by George Gillett in the title of the article under examination - that of a future society in which the mere fact of being biologically male or female (dismissively reduced by Firestone to “genital differences”) would be considered as trivial and inconsequential as eye colour, or as left- versus right-handedness. We are assured by both writers that getting rid of gender, aka “the sex distinction”, will lead to freedom from oppressive norms, to a sense of “liberation”, to greater self-expression and a gentler, happier world. In addition, a world without gender would, ineluctably, be a world without gender inequality – a lesser goal, as Gillett is at pains to emphasise, but still, by overwhelming consensus, a desirable one.

Written in the style of a persuasive essay and addressed, apparently, to a mainstream audience, Gillett’s article is built on the thesis that “gender equality”, which he notes is now a popular cause enjoying a widespread consensus, is both a progressive aspiration and an insufficient one (“stunted, incomplete and short-sighted”). This is because equality between “genders” presupposes the existence of said “genders”, and while it is surely true that a society in which both genders have equal rights and dignity is preferable to one in which they do not, it is nevertheless also true that the mere existence of gender norms and stereotypes in such a society will be felt by some people as inherently oppressive, particularly towards those who do not conform to existing gender norms whether by accident or by choice.

While the writer offers several examples of what he sees as the harmful and oppressive effects of current gender norms (including, inter alia, “sexism, homophobia and body dysmorphia”), he acknowledges that, if gender is as arbitrary and as malleable a construction as his argument and chosen definition assume, it ought to be possible to replace demonstrably “harmful” gender roles with more “positive” ones – pointing out that such “redefinition” of gender roles is being actively pursued at present by a coalition of journalists, academics and “high profile campaigns” like HeForShe. Nevertheless, he insists that no amount of well-intentioned “redefinition” will rid the gender distinction of its capacity to cause harm, since it is impossible to define a positive gendered characteristic that would not exclude a certain proportion of those identifying with the gender in question, and also because “the noxious idea that we can associate a positive set of behavioural characteristics with a physical sex is intrinsically flawed”.

Dismissing as unhelpful and self-defeating the alternative notion of a “gender spectrum” stretching between extremes of “masculinity” and “femininity” to replace the gender binary, Gillett is equally unimpressed by arguments that purport to anchor some gender stereotypes in biology (including alleged “brain differences” between the sexes). Here, his argument is that generalisations derived from large-scale statistical trends, even if assumed to be valid, should not be converted into social norms, lest we fall into “a perverse form of genetic determinism”. This leads on to perhaps the most direct and candid statement of the writer’s ideal: namely, the possibility of “individuals creating their own unique identity, regardless of their physical sex”. The lack of such freedom, in a society “fixated with controlling people’s behaviour” is, we are told in passing, the reason why a claimed 41% of trans people have attempted suicide.

Finally, after noting that the new gender-neutral pronoun championed by some Swedish media is a step in the right direction, the writer reiterates his conviction that the abolition of all gender distinctions is both possible and desirable. All this, quite remarkably, in an article in which the words “feminist” and “feminism” are conspicuous by their absence.

 

We have already noted that if Shulamith Firestone neglected to use the word “gender” in the quote which opens this essay, it was most likely because the term was not yet part of the popular vocabulary when she was writing. This fact alone should give us pause: it’s obvious that the absence of a defined concept of “gender” did not prevent sex-based discrimination and sex-based roles and stereotypes from occurring throughout history, nor did the lack of this word prevent a radical feminist like Firestone from delineating a utopian vision similar to the one proposed by Gillett. Clearly, the concept of gender itself is ancillary to the problems described and to their solution: what needs to go, presumably, is not this concept but rather the tendency of people to attach greater practical significance to sex than its “merely biological” nature deserves or requires.

At this point, the “Chesterton’s Fence” principle advises us that if we want to remove something, we need first of all to understand why it was put there in the first place. In this respect, the arguments of a Firestone have an advantage over Gillett, in that they can call on a vast corpus of feminist scholarship that situates gender in the context of a theorised patriarchy that makes use of gender norms as a means to perpetuate an unequal power structure in society in order to benefit one part of it. This theoretical background is altogether absent in Gillett’s article, which is doggedly noncommittal on the question of where gender comes from. We can only speculate on whether and to what extent the writer subscribes to Patriarchy Theory, and if not, what his alternative explanation is. This lack of a historical and causal context does not necessarily undermine his thesis, but certainly reduces its persuasiveness: we may conclude there is little point in listening to solutions from someone who is unable to account for the problem. (It should be noted in passing that Patriarchy Theory is far from universally accepted, and seems to the present writer to represent a caricatured view of history and of social relations: it’s certainly not something we can just take for granted as a default explanation.)

An argument could be made that by adopting a concept of “gender” defined as a pure social construct, we have achieved a more generally positive change in social attitudes than would otherwise have been possible: “gender”, in this view, is merely a useful conceptual tool or model in the service of societal progress, to be jettisoned when it has served its purpose. However, a growing number of heterodox thinkers are now expressing misgivings about the use of the word, and even some academic feminists are now discussing perceived shortcomings in what is known as “the sex/gender distinction”, particularly in its radical decoupling of biological sex and social behaviour (it’s worth mentioning that some languages, such as German, do not even make a sex/gender distinction). It is perhaps no accident that in the popular mind, “gender” and “sex” are often used interchangeably and are frequently confused conceptually. Gillett himself acknowledges there is evidence that “biological differences contribute to behavioural differences between the sexes” (tellingly, he is careful to mention only such differences as appear to favour women); what he does not appear to recognise is that, given this potential for confusion and lack of clear-cut boundaries between sex and gender, it is at least possible that some of those people he cites as proponents of “gender equality” may in fact be pursuing the more basic aim of “sex equality”, and have no particular interest or desire to perpetuate gender roles or differences per se. I suspect it would be difficult to find a single public pronouncement from Obama, Watson or Prince Harry that explicitly makes the case for the continuation of gender norms, roles or stereotypes. Could it be that the crucial difference between the ideal of “gender equality” and that of “abolishing gender” is less clear-cut than Gillett is willing to concede?

We may, of course, speculate that someone like Prince Harry or Emma Watson might privately be sympathetic to certain gendered norms or stereotypes, but consider it politic to avoid mentioning such sympathies in public, to avoid controversy. Regardless of whether this is so, the fact that nowadays public figures are expected to be scrupulous in avoiding expressions of “sexism”, and tend to be wearisomely apologetic when caught out, points to a sea change in social attitudes since the time Firestone was writing, when vocal expression of gender stereotypes was still acceptable. Ironically perhaps, it can be questioned whether this change has led to greater all-round freedom or “liberation”, Gillett’s stated objective. While certain people are, presumably, “liberated” from having their life choices, or their immutable characteristics, questioned on the basis of alleged divergence from a restrictive norm or stereotype, this freedom comes at the price of additional constraints on speech, obliging many to self-censor: we may question a “freedom” that, in order to exist, requires people to verbally dissemble. If we must imagine a utopia, perhaps it would be better to imagine one in which people were resilient enough to simply ignore any discourse that interfered with their self-image, their chosen identity or life choices, without having to defensively invoke the spectre of “oppression” and invoke the collective might of “cancel culture”.

Returning to the question of the artificial boundary between sex and gender, Gillett’s argument for discounting any and all scientific findings supportive of sex-based differences between male and female behaviour is surprisingly weak, and seems to be based on a misreading of the definition of gender he himself proposes. The definition in question states that gender consists of “roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women”. However, in questioning the importance of these scientific findings, Gillett reverts to a simplified notion of gender based only on “personality types”, and to the highly dubious notion that a person can be “oppressed” simply by finding that his or her actual personality traits are either not socially valued, or not in accordance with their gender, or a combination of both. Even if this were accepted, it is hard to see how abolishing gender would solve the problem, given that there would still be, presumably, a degree of social consensus regarding which traits were to be more or less valued, and hence, people lacking these characteristics would still be excluded. The absurd notion that in order not to be “oppressed” one must have one’s own individual personality traits perpetually validated by a breathlessly sycophantic “society” is the weakest part of Gillett’s argument, and points to a questionable analysis of the role of “society” which we will return to.

Likewise, while it is true that statistical tendencies cannot be used to accurately predict the personality or behaviour of an individual, and should probably not be used as an excuse to impose additional sex-based behavioural or social rules and restrictions (has anyone ever tried to do so?), the fact remains that if stereotypes exist, it is in part because the human mind works largely by generalising more or less tentatively from limited evidence, and that this generalising tendency is probably immune to social engineering. A distinction might be made here between “normal” and “appropriate”: the gendered expectations Gillett denounces involve, by his own definition, judgments of “appropriacy”, rather than judgments of what is normal or expected. To give an example: if we see a man dressed as Santa in December, we would probably find this both normal and appropriate, based on accumulated experience. If we see the same get-up in mid-August, we might find it abnormal, even weird, but would probably reserve judgment on whether it was “appropriate” or not until we had figured out what he was doing. “Inappropriate” would be the man in the Xmas grotto who dressed not as Santa but as Satan. We are capable, then, of recognising deviation from the norms and expectations created by everyday experience without necessarily turning them into moral strictures. We can entertain (and be entertained by) stereotypical ideas of “masculine” or “feminine” behaviour without morally judging those who either adhere to or depart from them.

In this regard, it might be instructive to consider the use made of “figures such as David Bowie, Mick Jagger and Annie Lennox” in the article. The writer points out that these pop stars defied to some extent “the constraints of gender” and were loved for it even while such “gender bending” aroused the opprobrium of a few antediluvians. However, it does not follow that if these constraints did not exist those people would have been as successful, or that their triumphant individuality would be equally celebrated. It is at least in part the very fact of their defiance, surely, that gives them their seductive aura of individuality and independence. The writer seems loth to admit that, as psychologists would tell us, an important part of the developmental process of creating an adult “identity” involves, necessarily, one or multiple acts of defiance against familial or social norms and impositions (despite this being one of the major plot themes in universal literature). It might even be said that the psychological role of society is to provide the restrictive framework in opposition to which we construct our identity as individuals. If so, then rather than reflexively seeking to change “society” (which Gillett, oblivious of cultural differences, appears to regard as a monolithic entity) into an enabling and validating parental figure, the best thing we can do is seek to change ourselves in opposition to society, and empower those around us to do likewise. If we are successful, “society” will follow. By this view, it should be psychologically integrated and empowered individuals who lead society, not vice versa. Horse before cart.

The writer asks, “What, exactly, is so scary about individuals creating their own unique identity, regardless of their physical sex?” What indeed? And it is precisely the fact that individual identity involves myriad factors whereas gender, as popularly understood, is a simple binary, that makes Gillett’s repeated confusion between gender and identity all the more mysterious (though in his defence, the confusion today seems to be widespread). Gender may be a part of how we identify ourselves in society, but it is not (or need not be) any part of how we see ourselves – our true inner identity, only a tiny part of which we can ever reveal to the world. We cannot control how others see us, and we cannot change “society” without succumbing to an authoritarian mindset, but we can decide how we see ourselves, and it is the freedom to do so, rather than any spurious freedom from criticism, social opprobrium or “offence” that perhaps ought to be valued if any real and lasting social change is to be effected.

 

We have, indeed, come a long way since 1970 and Firestone’s seminal The Dialectic of Sex. In some ways we have made undeniable progress – overcoming untenable sex-based discrimination in such varied fields as politics, academia, business and the professions - but when we compare the glib superficiality of Gillett’s analysis to the tormented writings of a Firestone, I think we can see we have lost something too. While the feminist writer was at least clearsighted enough to recognise that certain biological facts such as childbirth, and cultural myths such as romantic love, constitute a redoubtable obstacle on the path to equality, and demand both truly revolutionary solutions and a disciplined movement if such a utopian aim is to be achieved, Gillett not only blithely ignores the very existence of such a movement as it currently exists, but appears to assume that the sort of change he wants can be brought about on the basis of sloganizing (HeForShe), top-down linguistic innovation, and the sort of superficial and ultimately sterile persuasion that relies for its efficacy on finger-wagging and slavish repetition of the unchallengeable pieties of the day. Absent from the article is any acknowledgement of history, of the complexities of social change, of the scale of what has already been achieved and of the necessary trade-offs between rival social goods – not to mention the rootedness of our notions of sex or gender in the biological imperative of reproduction, leading to our concomitant tendency to create idealised (and extremely “gendered”) templates of sexual partners, the avatars of which we spend much of our time pursuing. For this reason alone, on the psychological level at least and to paraphrase Voltaire, if gender didn’t exist we would almost certainly have to invent it.

 

 

REFERENCES

Firestone, Shulamith (1970). The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (1st ed.). New York, New York: William Morrow and Company. ISBN 0-688-12359-7.